One hundred and ten years ago Edwin Chadwick began service on the General Board of Health in England. The creation of this agency marked the most important socio-sanitary step of the early nineteenth century. Just as Chadwick set the pace for that period, so Professor Winslow, in the twentieth century, with public health problems even more interwoven with the fabric of society, rekindled this torch of leadership.
It is perhaps inevitable that any one conscious of the depth and breadth of Winslow's vision would choose for the subject of this address an area of public health activity appropriate to that vision. He might himself have selected it for passionate leadership well in advance of the army of health officers. Because of the many opportunities for the prevention of disease, he would have sensed the impact of radiation upon society. The challenge of the new was always his hallmark and the subject would have been his. My thesis honors his name, while the lectureship gives me the opportunity to pay permanent tribute to a great teacher.
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation points out in 1958 that "living beings have always been exposed to ionizing radiation from various natural sources."'1 It may seem surprising, therefore, that such general interest has now been aroused in radiation exposure as a potential disease producer of increasing significance. The discovery of x-rays in 1895 and of radioactivity in uranium salts in 1896 had already demonstrated the eternal necessity for preserving an equilibrium between the benefits from scientific discoveries and the hazards associated with their application. Almost no scientific or technological advance has ever produced completely beneficent results without posing considerations of control of their adverse effects.
The prime advantages resulting to society in the development and use of x-rays in medicine and in industry cannot be overestimated. Their diagnostic, therapeutic, and research contributions loom large in the history of * Lecturer and Professor of Sanitary Engineering. ** The C.-E. A. Winslow Lecture, Yale University, November 20, 1958. science. Their uses, however, led to the responsibility of voluntary and official agencies for delineating the limits of radiation to which the individual might be exposed with minimum risk.
To these developments of the twentieth century, tremendous man-made radioactivity has now been added. Its amount is unprecedented in all of history. The discovery of nuclear fission in 1939 and its rapidly emerging applications have given new emphases to the significance of radiation as a source of disease production. Wholly aside from the military implications of nuclear fission, the peace-time application of atomic energy and the prospect of similar applications with fusion processes have re-focused attention upon radiation hazards and their disease potential. The dramatic current emphasis, of course, has been upon the contamination of the environment by the explosion of nuclear weapons. There is general agreement, however, most recently confirmed by the United Nations Scientific Committee, that at the present rate of detonations these contaminations are far outweighed by the natural sources of radioactivity, by the potential hazards in the discharge of radioactive wastes from nuclear reactors, by possible accidents in reactors, and from the increasing use of x-rays, and of radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes.
The radiations to which human beings are exposed from natural and man-made sources are similar in their physical nature and in general in the character of their biological effects. Unfortunately the amount of information with respect to the biological effects is far less than is the knowledge of the physics of radiation itself. The gross features of biological impact and the detailed quantitative aspects of their relationships to radiation dosage require much clarification.
At this moment no cure is at hand for the results of radiation exposure on man. The day may come when treatment of radiation sickness or of radiation effects in general may be available. Until that time arrives, both somatic and genetic effects lend themselves to control only via the route of prevention. This is singularly, therefore, a problem subject to the procedures generally used in the field of preventive medicine and public health. Unless biological effects are prevented through increasingly intelligent and perhaps even rigid regulatory measures, larger numbers of individuals will probably sustain significant injury.
It is a tribute to the atomic energy industry in this country, in England, in France, and in other European countries that the disabilities so far experienced in the rapidly developing atomic energy industry have been minor in their effect both upon the industrial worker and the population at large. This experience, however, serves equally well as an indicator of the necessity of highly experienced supervision and of rapidly extending control over design, construction, and operation.
THE PROBLEM IN RADIATION
A few basic physical concepts are necessary for some understanding of the problem with which the industry is and will be concerned. The radiations include x-rays, neutrons, protons, cosmic rays, and the alpha, beta, and gamma rays from radioactive materials in general. The energy transfer from all of these radiations is similar in nature and all produce biological effects. In each instance the energy absorbed in the tissue determines the nature and the amount of the biological effect.
The lifetime of a given radioisotope varies with the nature of the material and unfortunately over short and extremely long periods of time. The familiar quantitative statement of such variations, namely, the half-life of radioactive isotopes, ranges from thousand millions of years (uranium 238) down to a very small fraction of a second (radium C').
The biological effects stemming from exposure to ionizing radiation differ in essential characteristics from almost any other biological phenomena with which we have hitherto dealt. Some parallelism appears to exist between the aging process in man and the biological effects of radiation. The aging process in fact may have some dominant consequences of radiation exposure. Aside from this comparison, however, the complexity of biological effects is not so easily matched in most of the preventable diseases with which the public health officer has been familiar. The type of radiation, its energy, the size of the dose, its distribution in time, its distribution with respect to the body or parts thereof, and the origin of the radiation all influence the result. Similarly, a series of biological factors affect the sensitivity of a tissue or radiation.
When one turns to genetic effects, even more complicated phenomena arise, which make the necessity, as well as the nature, of the control most difficult.
The population of the world is now exposed to natural and man-made environmental contamination. The relative quantities of exposure to each of these categories are reasonably agreed upon in the findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee, the U. S. National Academy of Sciences, and the British Medical Research Council.
Our concern at this time is dominantly with the man-made sources. They include (a) medical uses of x-rays and radioactive materials, (b) industrial and research uses of x-rays and radioactive materials, (c) other sources, such as luminous dials of watches, TV sets, and shoe-fitting fluoroscopes.
More important, however, in these man-made sources is the radioactive contamination of man's environment, other than those listed above, which result primarily from nuclear explosions or from radioactive wastes disposal or from accidents involving dispersion of radioactivity. The radiation doses from the last two sources are still small, but in the future they may become appreciable.
In general, it is not an unfair conclusion that all steps designed to minimize unnecessary irradiation of human populations will bring great benefits in human health. The translation of such a principle into action will necessarily include the avoidance of exposure from medical, industrial, or other procedures for the peaceful uses of nuclear processes. This principle rests upon the assumption that even the smallest amounts of radiation may cause deleterious genetic, and perhaps also somatic, effects. The problem confronting us, therefore, presents one of the most complicated regulatory issues, simply because both somatic and genetic effects of radiation are often long delayed in appearance. The possibilities of industrial, medical, and general research application are such that extension of use of sources of radiation will move forward with great rapidity. At each step in this progress the responsibility of the health officer expands. Materials of potential hazards occur at every step in the evolution of this industry, from the initial mining of radioactive ores to the final use of radioisotopes, x-rays, and other sources of radiation.
Some examples of the nature of these problems may be helpful. They are by no means all-embracing in scope, but they are chosen to illustrate the kind of difficult:y with which administrative agencies are and will be increasingly confronted.
EXAMPLES OF SOURCES OF RADIATION

Diagnostic radiology
The evidence so far accumulated suggests that genetic damage to humans due to exposure to ionizing radiation is greater than was previously assumed. Since the judicious use of diagnostic radiology has been one of medicine's most important tools for almost half a century, a great deal of emphasis is now being placed upon the actual exposures being received and the genetic consequences thereof. As to the former, detailed studies are now increasingly reported in the literature which provide quantitative evidence of the nature and the amount of the exposure in diagnostic radiology. The genetic consequences are under similar detailed scrutiny, with of course much more delayed detailed and total findings.
The investigations and the scrutiny of procedural methods already suggest broad significant modification in current radiological practice. The U. S. Public Health Service, followed by a number of the states, has already promulgated revisions in tuberculosis x-ray case-finding practice. Modifications in policy and practice in the use of x-rays during pregnancy have also resulted from this emphasis. General hospital practice has led to significant control of the indiscriminate use of the fluoroscope.
In the more advanced hospitals detailed supervision of both diagnostic and therapeutic use of radioisotopes have come into force. Somewhat more elaborate administrative control units have appeared throughout the country, with astonishingly detailed regulatory programs already operative.
All of these measures have taken as their basic assumption that the use of radiation in one form or another represents a fundamental technique bringing high fruits to society. All of the studies have disclosed opportunities for a more intelligent application of such fundamental techniques, while reducing materially the objectionable impact of radiation upon man. Coupled with these changes in practice have come systematic inspections of all equipment to insure that radiation exposure, not only of the general population, but of the instrument user is reduced to a minimum.
Chamberlain' has recently summarized the situation in the following terms: "The present exposure to radiation for medical and dental purposes can be appreciably reduced by techniques and methods that are already available. These are economically feasible, and largely require only interest, education, and the use of well established information and instruments." The quantitative significance of this conclusion is enhanced when it is recalled that somewhat over 130,000 roentgen ray machines are in use in the United States. One-half of these belong to dentists and hospitals and the other half to doctors, osteopaths, chiropodists, and chiropractors. The advances to be gained by the judicious use of such equipment should not be dissipated by undue exposures which bring only danger either to the general population or to the practitioner. In this field of activity, as in so many others of technological advance, all of our control history indicates that "we may have our pie and eat it too."
Accidents
The potential hazards arising from operation of nuclear reactors are very great. The possibility of damage from nuclear explosion in nuclear reactors is small, but the accidental release of fission product inventories accumulated in the operation of reactors could cause extensive damage and destruction. Numerous studies have been made of these potentials, all of which are carefully scrutinized within the Atomic Energy Commission review. The problems are highly complex, but the record up to the present time has been good.
It must be recalled, however, that a conceivable accident in a power plant of 400 to 500 megawatts could lead, under a pessimistic combination of circumstances, to the fatal exposure of three or four thousand people, injury to hundreds of thousands and contamination damage over thousands of square miles.
It becomes essential, therefore, that ample precaution and safeguards are taken to insure that dangerous releases of fission products do not occur, even from smaller plants where the potential hazards are materially less.
These factors affecting safety require a maximum of application of technical knowledge, a rigid adherence to design objectives and to an equally rigid control of operational practice. All of these in turn require thoughtful selection of sites, so that the consequences of either the unexpected or the improbable accidents are reduced to an absolute minimum. In every instance, reasonable assurance must be afforded that the facility can be constructed and operated at a proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. If such determination of criteria dominates normal operation, the radioactivity released beyond the site boundary must remain below the maximum permissible levels for continuous exposures. In the case of accidents, even from the worst credible one and under the most adverse dispersion conditions in nature, the doses beyond the boundary of the site must likewise be below the permissible (once in a lifetime) emergency doses.
The site-reactor design complex must be considered not only from the viewpoint of the designer and operator, but also of those responsible for the health and safety of the community. The accidents at Windscale, England, in Canada, and in the United States, all having fortunately minimum consequences to the public health, do remind us that decisions of a public health nature will be continuously required in the future. Shall arable land contaminated in a nuclear accident be taken out of use? Shall contaminated milk be destroyed? Shall populations be evacuated? Shall contaminated vegetables be distributed to the market?
Simple adherence to maximum permissible levels of concentration of various radioisotopes in the air, in water, and on land do not offer a complete handbook basis for administrative action. In every instance such permissible limits will have to be tempered by administrative decision as to the balance of values to be obtained in embargoes versus biological effects on the human population. Such administrative decisions will become complex and burdensome. That they cannot be avoided is almost axiomatic. That they will be met through current administrative practices is a reasonable prospect.
The safety record of reactor operations in the United States of America has been exceedingly good, due to rigid management and safety precautions. That accidents have occurred and will occur in this industry, as in others, really emphasizes the fact that administrative practice will have to be geared to such occurrences, particularly in view of the fact that such accidents hitherto recorded have been due both to personnel and to mechanical failures.
Waste products
The nuclear fission industry, as every other industrial process, will be plagued by the production of gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes. The nature and amount of these wastes differ with the type of process and reactor used.
The amount of radioactivity inherent in each of these sources is highly variable. The mixtures are complex, not only with respect to their radioactivity, but with respect to their physical and chemical characteristics.
The treatment, management, and disposal of these wastes is expensive and technologically difficult. With the exception of those wastes which are low in radioactive constituents, virtually none of the wastes of high activity emanating from these industries are discharged to nature even after varying degrees of treatment. It is unfortunately true that no man-made equipment can destroy radiation. The only effective means is via the natural process of decay. Therefore, tanks are used for storage of such materials, even for as long as a quarter of a century. This method is not only expensive, but actually does not solve the problem. Good housekeeping is the key to safety. Such housekeeping rests upon the precepts that the amount of wastes should be kept to a minimum, should always be contained, and should be kept separate and distinct for identification and monitoring.
The familiar processes of the chemical industry are applied in this field with only reasonable satisfaction. Methods of precipitation, filtration, ion exchange, distillation, and biological processes have been used to reduce, to concentrate, and to make manageable the holding of these radioactive materials. Where these are released to nature, the permitted concentrations necessarily provide for a high factor of safety.
Concern for the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the food we eat makes the control of these sources of contamination one of the great challenges of the future. It is the only series of wastes in all of our industrial history which cannot be released to nature and for which only time for aging provides the safest answer. Even the location for the managed deposition and holding of these materials becomes a matter of interest and concern to society. Decision with respect to this and many other aspects of the developing industry cannot be left exclusively to the producer.
Transportation
Many solid, liquid, and gaseous substances of widely varying radioactivity are now shipped through a great many areas of the United, States. Their hazards range from the so-called radium paint used on instrument dials, of very low activity, to materials of high activity and long half-life. The latter must be packaged and transported with extreme care to reduce the number and severity of accidents and to prevent either the liberation of radiation or the contamination of the environment.
Transportation has been given detailed attention by the Atomic Energy Commission with particular reference to type of container, freight, safety hazard, costs, transportation mode and vehicle, and route of shipment. Safe transportation of these materials along public transport lanes from production sites to consumer, and to processing or disposal sites involves many problems of health and safety. It is an area which is still under careful evaluation. The problem has been managed up to the present time with both 238 Volume 31, Februa 1959 'ry Radiation and the health officer WOLMAN skill and absence of difficulty. The volume of high level liquid wastes will mount decade by decade and will reach millions of gallons by 1980. Each year, therefore, the complexity of the problem will increase correspondingly. Products of less radioactive significance now represent tens of thousands of shipments annually. The participation of official health agencies in the appraisal and control of these operations is virtually nonexistent.
PRESENT STATUS
A tentative summary of the radiation problem would lead one to the conclusion that sources of radiation are rapidly on the increase, that no effective method is available for preventing damage to a cell by ionizing radiation and that treatment, once damage has been done, is nonexistent. Only one recourse remains to society in the control of this important addition to scientific knowledge and use. Access of radiation to human beings should be prevented and controlled by every conceivable and ingenious means. The prevention of accidents in turn requires the highest degree of supervision of all sources of radiation and a continuing and perpetuial alertness to the observance of evolving criteria and rules of operation and behavior. This task is already so complex that it offers a challenge hitherto quite unknown in public health control procedures, although it will parallel the more familiar ones in the historical interposition of barriers between disease and man.
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPUCATIONS
An attitude of precision of control must be bred into each designer, constructor, and operating staff in order to make sure that hazard potential has been reduced to a minimum and that precautions in case of unexpected accident will be intelligently implemented. The mere listing of the uses to which the modern world has put sources of radiation tends to confuse and to horrify the abstract and theoretical designer of regulatory procedures. History shows that administrative control has proceeded in many areas of complexity in modern living on an ad hoc improvisation basis. Supervision results from daily development of the details of problem control. Before long, regulatory procedures are in force and controls and counter-controls have been developed. Operating personnel pursue their tasks quite unconscious of all of the precautions which they skillfully practice. The general population goes about its normal daily business unaware of the checks, the restrictions, and the defenses which some agency somewhere has carefully devised and enforced for its protection.
The development of radiation use has been accompanied by rapid parallel understanding of hazards and of devices and practices for their prevention and control. The consequences of accidents are increasingly understood, but experience with them on a large scale still remains to be developed. Only when such accidents have occurred will the extent and severity of their consequences be fully appreciated. The lessons to be learned from disaster may be anticipated in theory, but must actually be learned the hard way in reality.
The function which already confronts the health officer with respect to radiation is one which must give him pause, but not one which should lead him to avoid the responsibility which is primarily his. Within the hospital, industry, and general research areas, sources of radiation have mounted in almost astronomical fashion. Each hospital will ultimately have to provide a radiological control committee or board. The supervision of use and practice by such an overlying committee is undoubtedly irksome, but essential. Diagnostic and therapeutic uses of radiation are so great in every hospital that internal policing by a responsible unit is not only indicated for the future, but is increasingly practised in major institutions today.
An agency external to the hospital, such as a health department, assumes a responsibility for the final disposal of radioactive wastes from every medical institution. Such wastes range all the way from radioactive animal carcasses to materials discharged to the atmosphere and into the public sewers. Solid materials likewise require supervised packaging and ultimate placement in a safe permanent depository.
In industry,' powerful x-ray sets are now employed in open areas for taking pictures of welds in the plates of ships under construction or of large structures being erected or tested outside of the buildings. The list of other uses mounts, of which only a few are as follows: shoe-fitting fluoroscopes, static eliminators in textile and similar manufactures, isotopes for thickness gauges, examination of welds with cobalt 60 or other sources, measurement of solidification boundaries in castings, the emerging potential of sterilization of food and drugs, the activation of chemical processes, the uses of radioactive materials in agriculture, the attempt to pasteurize dairy products by radiation, the treatment of meats for the elimination of trichina, and the handling of hides for the destruction of anthrax.
The use of reactors for mobile equipment poses unexplored and at the moment unsolved national and international issues. The reactor in submarines, in surface ships, in air craft, and in space rocket propulsion-all inevitable consequences of modern science-create conditions of potential risk. All of them must be so designed, constructed, and operated that this risk is kept to an absolute minimum, with normal operation or in accident.
State and national responsibility must be ultimately expanded to international control. No part of the world will remain free of the control necessi-ties here discussed. Already some significant efforts and arrangements have been developed for international participation in appraisal of problem and in control of effects.
In the control and regulation of radiation sources, universal agreement must be found on the kind and magnitude of criteria which should be enforced. Fortunately, most individuals and public health agencies appear to be ready to accept the values hitherto made available by the National Committee on Radiation Protection. The Committee's deliberations since the 1920's have gained the respect of scientific workers. The maximum permissible levels which it and the International Committee on Radiation Protection have promulgated represent the bases of most state, national, and international applications. The mere existence of these permissible levels, however, is not a substitute for continuing administrative judgment. Each permissible level suggested implies a certain degree of risk. The health official in every instance of action is confronted with balancing risk against values to society. He must from time to time determine whether acceptance of the maximum permissible level or exceeding it is the part of regulatory wisdom. For example, should vegetables or milk be banned from use if they exceed the maximum permissible levels now at hand? The health officer cannot avoid providing a judgment as to when and at what level of concentration materials should be prohibited for wide distribution and consumption. It will be the part of wisdom in every significant decision to summon up the best advice in this complicated area of hazard. Multiple scientific disciplines are the bases of this industry. This practice of using advisory service is a common and familiar organizational asset.
Departments of labor, highway commissions, boards of economic control, health departments, and other agencies have responsibility in this rapidly evolving field. Past experience has shown that central responsibility for such hazards as are here under discussion has historically rested upon departments of health and of labor. In Government, the partition of such responsibility as between the workers in industry and the general public has been reasonably delineated and has been functionally successful.
It is doubtful indeed whether any new agencies are needed to encompass the broad role here described. It is equally doubtful whether the establishment of a coordinating office is indicated in most of the operations of our state agencies. Those less familiar with regulatory activities in the field of health and industrial safety visualize increasing problems of competitive action, variable standards for health and safety, and confusion in public regulation. Most of these fears have not been exemplified in the evaluation of health and safety controls in other fields historically affecting society.
There is little reason to suppose that such organizational confusion and competition will result in this area. Competition certainly can be avoided by placing this responsibility in the two primary agencies within the states in which precedent for prevention of disease has shown clear and successful performance.
EMERGING PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSIBILITY Workers in public health could not long ignore the issues here discussed without increasing consciousness of their responsibility to society. In different countries, different approaches to the dual areas of the developer and of the regulator of hazard have been manifested.
In the United States, the Atomic Energy Commission, certainly for the first ten years of its activities, accepted the contrasting obligations of developing both the science and art of nuclear fission operations and of assuring the health and safety of worker and general public. As works increased both in number and in complexity, this duality of function has become increasingly untenable, if not actually embarrassing.
From the beginning, the Commission, always aware to a high degree of its responsibility for health and safety, created a Committee of Review of all reactors to be built. The present Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards now serves both the Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The ACRS is now a statutory committee created by Congress.
As problems multiplied, however, the AEC took the additional step of creating a full-time Hazards Evaluation Branch as a separate entity from its units engaged in research and development. The division of Biology and Medicine, of long standing in the Commission, continues its function as an advisory unit and as a broad stimulator and sponsor of pertinent research.
In this evolving process over the last two decades, official public health agencies, both federal and state, remained largely on the periphery of action rather than in their rightful position of exercising responsibility in arriving at criteria of safety, of participation in the selection of sites, of taking decisive action on waste management, of reviewing the manifold decisions with respect to mobile reactors on land, air, and sea and the use of land and sea for deposition of radioactive materials.
Fortunately, this state of apathy or reluctance has changed rapidly. The U. S. Public Health Service has recently established a separate division to concern itself with these problems and has created a special advisory board to the Surgeon General for the continuing examination of radiation problems and of the position which the Service should assume in this area.
From August 1954 to July 1958 eight states have adopted broad, comprehensive radiation control regulations, e.g. California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Thirteen other states now require registration of hazardous radiation sources. Still more are concerning themselves with radioactive wastes so that their management and disposal will accord with those required for industrial wastes in general. Undoubtedly before long, every state will adopt some procedure for health and labor departments to assume these responsibilities.
Hilleboe and Rihm, Jr.,' have recently succinctly summarized the essential reasons for the movements briefly noted here, in the following terms:
"Atomic fission and fusion, spawned in this fabulous 20th century, have radically changed the environment for every living creature on the face of the earth. Only by preventive action now and continuing vigilance in the future, can we hope to avoid the devastating effects of unnecessary exposure to ionizing radiation."
In England, the evolution of control has paralleled, in essential principles, that in the United States. In recent years, however, the industry has been converted by parliamentary act into a quasi-independent agency having some of the characteristics of a publicly owned private company. In this form, its activities are at least in theory subject to the review and control of health, industry, and housing and planning public bodies.
The Windscale accident" perhaps focused attention on the inadequacies of the relations of the atomic energy industry to the orthodox regulatory groups, and in turn to the natural users, such as water purveyors. This unhappiness at the present state of affairs is best exemplified in the Interim Report to the Executive Committee of the British Water Works Association by its Subcommittee on Radioactive Substances.! The following excerpts are pertinent:
"The machinery of ad hoc administrative arrangements may well have been adequate in the early days of the development of the Atomic Energy Industry. These days have passed and there is now a clear need for the arrangements to be put on a proper footing and for the water authorities to have the right to be consulted and warned about the things which are likely to affect them and their duties in respect of the public water supplies of the country."
The Fleck Report" 7 on the Windscale accident makes it abundantly clear that there are serious deficiencies in the machinery for dissemination of knowledge, and for consultation and cooperation between those responsible for the atomic energy industry and those who may possibly be affected by its operations.
Knowing the flair of the English for resolving the tangled skeins of administrative competitive practice, it is predictable that these increasing evidences of lack of integration will be the subject before long of parliamentary inquiry and correction. The industry is obviously moving out of its infancy both in the United States and in England. Its maturity will bring it into the "wholeness" of supervision to which every other industry has long been exposed to protect the public at large. That supervision should be skillful, informed, and minimal consistent with health and safety.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
Scientific knowledge in this age of communication speed has wings. No country long provides containment of knowledge. This is fantastically true in atomic energy. No country in the world is unaware of its potentials. Some countries look to it as their salvation, which it is rarely likely to be.
In consequence of these hopes, however, the values as well as the problems of nuclear fission and of radiation have leaped national boundaries and created national and international issues. By the early sixties power reactors producing over a million kilowatts will be operating in Europe, exclusive of England. Research and power reactors will go forward at the same time in some forty nations of the world. Centers for radioisotope research, schools for training of professional and subprofessional workers, and international distribution of sources of radiation have moved forward with such rapidity that even an assessment of their impact becomes wellnigh impossible.
Radioactive materials are moving on international routes, chemical processing of fuels will proceed in regional plants, discharges of low level wastes will reach international streams, the oceans are receiving and will continue to receive increasing amounts of radioactive liquids and solids, and locations of reactors on or near borders of nations will increase. Virtually all officials are searching for appraisal, understanding, and agreement between nations as to the management of this new inaterial, process and effect. For the first time in history, the discharge of radioactive wastes into the seas found a place on the agenda of the International Conference on the Seas at the 1958 Geneva sessions.
In essence, every one is on a search of how to live with radiation. The temperament guiding most participants in these national as well as inter-national deliberations was well phrased by Karl Z. Morgan of the Oak Ridge National Laboratories in these words: "One should not fear radiation but one must respect it !" Formal international agreements will ensue which will undoubtedly be based upon these precepts.
SUMMARY
The last twenty years have been the period of greatest progress in understanding and development of nuclear fission and fusion in the history of the world. This progress has been paralleled by unprecedented use of radiation sources for biological and industrial purposes. In these advances, major collateral progress has been made in the modification and creation of materials, processes, and equipment which would not otherwise have occurred for several decades to come.
The hazards resulting from these developments must be balanced against the obvious and great benefits of radiation uses. Although the latter are at times exaggerated by some of the enthusiastic supporters of this work, no one may fairly deny the fact that radiation use will produce great advantages to society. Ways must and will be found to make such use compatible with the health and safety of man.
The theoretical listing of the administrative measures thus required inevitably stress the multiplicity and complexity of such efforts. Society, however, has long met its environmental challenges by ad hoc improvisation of administrative structures and techniques. If paraded before us, they would stagger us by their large number and complexity. They are pragmatic results of necessity and they work. The control of radiation use will likewise fall into place in the structure of orthodox agencies long experienced in assuming new, while relaxing old, obligations.
Health departments are rapidly extending their responsibility in these areas.' They do so because radiation hazards are real, exposure is increasing and adds to body stresses, and because it can be controlled and reduced without losing the increasing benefits and values of such application. It is of grave public health concern to control the limits of eventual contamination of the environment of reactors. Since it is practically impossible to remove radioactive contamination once it occurs, the ounce of prevention is literally worth a ton of cure. Prevention of disease is the health officer's dominant responsibility in this new area as in the more familiar domains of the past. That he can meet this challenge, once he fully recognizes it, no one should doubt.
